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Book Review
Environment and Equity: A Regulatory Challenge.
By Daniel R. Mandelker.* New York: McGrawHill Book Co. 1981. Pp. 162. $24.95.
I. INTRODUCTION
As its title suggests, Environment and Equity: A Regulatory Challenge by Professor Daniel R. Mandelker is an examination of several issues involved in the use of the regulatory
power of government to preserve environmental resources.
Professor Mandelker addresses five major problems in the
book. He begins by considering why marketplace allocations of
the burdens and benefits created by individuals living in a society may not always be acceptable. He contends that, because
the marketplace may not accommodate a sufficiently broad
range of affected interests, government may properly intervene
from time to time to bring about a different distribution of such
burdens and benefits.1
When government does intervene and uses its regulatory
power to restrict the use of land, several problems of fairness
or equity may arise. One such problem addressed by Professor
Mandelker is that of compensable takings-the point at which a
regulation becomes so onerous that it may not constitutionally
be imposed in the absence of some form of compensation. The
other fairness problem involves the possible adverse effects a
regulation may have on third parties. Using exclusionary zoning as an example, 2 Professor Mandelker demonstrates how the
burdens of governmental restrictions on certain persons' behavior may also indirectly impose significant burdens on
others. A zoning ordinance restricting all residential development to single family dwellings on large lots will necessarily re*

Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.

1.

D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQurrY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE

6 (1981). See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835,
848 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Competition simply does not and cannot further the interests that lie behind most social welfare legislation.").
2. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 29-31, 79-84.
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duce the availability of housing for people with modest
resources.
The author also considers the limited role the courts have
been willing to assume in implementing various federal and
state statutes 3 and state constitutional amendments designed
to protect environmental resources. Although his focus is primarily on forms of governmental intervention designed to preserve features of the natural environment, such as open space,
wetlands, seashores, and wild life habitats, he also considers
some aspects of the man-made environment, for example, historic and archaeological sites. He concludes that the courts
have generally been disinclined to protect these resources as
4
fully as environmentalists might have liked.
Professor Mandelker devotes the final section of his book
to a description of the development and implementation of the
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.5 He also uses
this material to illustrate the general preference of both Congress and state legislatures for a decentralized development of
the rules and policies governing environmental preservation by
delegating, with little substantive guidance, the basic lawmaking authority to courts, administrative agencies, or local government. He suggests that this legislative preference for
decentralized lawmaking is a result of the highly controversial
and political nature of many of the issues, the general preference in land use regulation for localized decision making, and
the lack of a broad-based consensus supporting environmental
resources and values. 6
The book provides a good factual description of what courts
and legislatures have been doing in the area of environmental
preservation. Professor Mandelker fails, however, to identify
clearly and to develop adequately the fundamental policy issues and assdmptions that underlie the problems he considers.
As a result, his discussions lack the in-depth critical analysis
one would expect.
Two related policy issues underlie the regulatory problems
raised by the book. Because people may deem a given marketplace distribution of benefits and burdens as inappropriate, the
principles for deciding when and to what extent governmental
3. E.g., MmN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1977), in particular, §§ 116B.03 and
116B.04.
4. D. M~mELKnR, supra note 1, at 108.
5. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280; see also Coastal Zone Management Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013.
6. D. MANDELKER, swpra note 1, at 156-57.
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regulations should be preferred over market allocations are exceedingly important. In addition, when government is used to
seek a different distribution, the principles for determining
which branch and level of government is best suited to that
task should be clearly identified. Common to both policy issues
are the assumptions that widespread participation by community members in the making of these allocative decisions is desirable, and that, in a democratic society operating under an
open, competitive economic system, widespread participation
can only be had by individuals casting their votes in either the
marketplace or the voting booth.
II.

CHOOSING THE MARKETPLACE OR
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION

Most human activities generate extended consequences
that affect, or are perceived as affecting, other people-what
economists refer to as externalities. 7 Such activities may relate
fairly directly to participation in the marketplace itself or may
be far removed from it. In either case, no one can seriously
doubt the importance of the marketplace as a social institution
for shifting or reallocating such burdens and benefits. Those
engaged in marketplace or other activities do so, however, in
light of their individual value systems. Their decisions therefore are not expected to, and do not, take full account of all
these externalities.
Because of the time, effort, and other resources needed to
enter into marketplace transactions, those who may feel burdened by the activities of others may not succeed in having
their values recognized in the marketplace. The costs of preparing oneself to get others to recognize these values, when added to to the cost of the bargain itself, may exceed the value of
any benefit that might be gained.8 Moreover, those who feel
themselves burdened by the activity of another may see no justice in the notion that, to rid themselves of the preceived burden, they must be willing to transfer some of their resources. 9
In such circumstances, people may seek to use their legal instiFor an economist's perspective of the ideas discussed in this section,
AND PROPERTY: THE EcoNoMIcS AND PoLirics OF
LAND-USE PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 21-44 (1980).
7.

see G. BroRx, LIFE, LIBERTY,

8. The leading article on transaction costs is Coase, The Problem of Social
Cos4 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
9. Cf. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 163-71
(1973) (discussing the relevance of "but for" or actual cause as an essential element of liability in tort law).
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tutions to have their interests or values recognized, by urging
the creation and implementation of legal rules that will result
in a different distribution of perceived burdens and benefits.
In the first section of his book, Professor Mandelker appears to suggest as a basic principle that it is proper for the
government to intervene if there are values involved that the
marketplace fails fully to recognize because of high transaction
costs.' 0 That condition alone, I would suggest, is not sufficient.
Simply because several neighbors might encounter high transaction costs in trying to induce another neighbor to paint his or
her house a different color should not alone justify the law's intervention. High transaction costs may warrant the government's considering intervention, but other criteria or standards
seem essential for deciding whether intervention should occur,
and, if so, what kind. Using some basic governing principle,
some legal institution must decide whether the burden complained about, and the values on which it is based, justify the
countervailing burdens governmental intervention will impose
on others.
Such a decision presents a cost-benefit problem. Some
writers seem to suggest, though probably unintentionally, that
account should be taken only of those burdens and benefits for
which a price can be determined by reference to the marketplace." Professor Mandelker, to his credit, recognizes that
there are human values that cannot easily be monetized, but
which may nonetheless deserve recognition, including some
values associated with environmental resources. 12 Although he
makes a fairly persuasive case as to why the marketplace alone
cannot adequately protect these values,13 he does not suggest
10. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 5-17.
11. See, e.g., Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 1 J. LEGAL
STuD. 13, 25-28 (1972). But see Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL SvuD.
29, 46-47 (1972).
12. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 12-14. The law does recognize values
which cannot easily be monetized by reference to the marketplace. Common
law courts have long awarded damages for physical pain and emotional distress. Similarly, courts have frequently used their equitable powers, as in specific performance and specific restitution cases, because the legal remedy of
damages as measured by the marketplace would be inadequate.
Professor Mandelker, however, has erred in his conclusion that most environmental values cannot be monetized. Many governmental entities regularly
spend public tax dollars in the marketplace to buy parks or open space for the
explicit purpose of preserving such values.
13. Id. at 8-15. Environmental values can be monetized, and to the extent
Professor Mandelker relies on the difficulty of monetizing such values as a reason for governmental intervention, he is incorrect. See supra note 12. To the
extent that he relies on high transaction costs, he is correct. The more relevant
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any clear governing principle for determining when the legal
system should give environmental values priority over other social values.14
Developing adequate principles for deciding when government should intervene to preserve environmental resources,
and whether it should do so by an exercise of the regulatory
power or the power of eminent domain, is complicated by the
uniqueness of the social values involved. Generally, when government intervenes, for example, through the tort or criminal
law, it does so by restricting one person's freedom-imposing a
burden-for the purpose of bestowing a primary benefit on an-

other person by protecting that person's resources-his or her
body or property. Further benefits are secondarily conferred
on society's members by maintaining the productive capacity of
the protected resources. Such environmental legislation as the
Clean Air 15 and Clean Water Acts16 share these policy objecquestion is whether governmental intervention should take the form of a police
power regulation or an action in condemnation. I believe Professor
Mandelker's concern about monetizing environmental values is more a concern
about what form governmental intervention should take, rather than whether
governmental intervention can be justified at all. His views on the takings
problem support this conclusion. See D. MANDELKEP, supra note 1, at 47-51; infra note 17 and accompanying text.
14. He does suggest the general criterion of economic efficiency-the use
of a cost-benefit analysis, D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 14, 15,-which he considers further in chapter 3, at 24-33. He does not, however, seem to be willing to
disown entirely what he characterizes as the "absolute set of values" of environmentalists. Id. at 21-24. Many instances of governmental intervention can
be justified under the principle that they are necessary to preserve the proper
functioning of the marketplace itself, for example, the law of property, contract,
antitrust, and unfair competition. See, e.g., G. BJoRc, supra note 7, at 22-23, 25.
Much of tort law can be justified under the principle that the ordinary expectations on which people count in living their everyday lives should be protected
because the result is a more efficient use of limited resources. Klemme, The
Enterprise Liability of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 180-82, 215-22 (1976). No
comparable governing principle, however, is explicitly proposed by Professor
Mandelker for deciding when governmental intervention may be warranted to
protect environmental values.
It can be argued that conducting a direct cost-benefit analysis in each case,
as Professor Mandelker seems to suggest, provides an adequate standard. Interestingly, courts seldom, if ever, are willing to use a cost-benefit analysis for
that purpose. Instead, courts prefer to use some other standard which will usually be easier to apply in particular cases, while also achieving in most, if not
all cases, an economically efficient solution. For example, in negligence law,
reference is made to the reasonably prudent person. In nuisance law, references are typically made to the character of the locality and to the sensibilities
of ordinary persons. See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194-95,
77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953). The elaborate, and generally futile, treatment of nuisance law by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A-831 (1979), which
essentially calls for a direct cost-benefit analysis, suggests the wisdom of the
courts' abjuring this approach.
15. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); Clean Air Act
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tives. Government intervenes to keep one person from using
his or her person or property in a way that reduces other people's freedom or capacity to use their resources. Legislation
designed to preserve historic sites or natural environmental
features, however, has a different goal. Government intervenes
in these areas because a person who seeks to change the use of
his or her property will take away a perceived benefit previously enjoyed in that property by neighbors or the public at
large. There is, for example, a difference between a landowner
who operates a factory which, because of its noise and smoke,
impairs the neighbors' enjoyment of their land, and another
landowner who, by building houses, will destroy the scenic
value the land previously provided the neighbors. Professor
Mandelker acknowledges this distinction in his discussion of
the takings problem, but rejects it as not significant.17
Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
16. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246;
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
17. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 40-44. Professor Joseph Sax thought
the distinction significant enough to revise substantially his thinking about the
takings problem. Compare Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L. J. 149, 150 n.5 (1971) with Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L. J. 36 (1964). As an economist, Bjork views the distinction as critical. G.
BJORK, supra note 7, at 111-122.
Professor Mandelker suggests that the takings problem can be solved by
looking at events over a period of time. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 47-51.
He argues that as persons buy and sell real property they "internalize" costs
arising from land use regulations, including regulations designed to preserve
environmental resources:
Landowners suffer losses in regulated land markets only when they
speculate against the land-use regulation system. Speculation is voluntary, and losses voluntarily incurred should not provide reason to find a
taking.... Speculators are not legitimately entitled to the "expectation" that the system will reward speculation by modifying land-use restrictions to allow development on their land.
Id. at 51.
Under this dubious analysis, every land use regulation apparently would in
time become immune from any claim of unconstitutional taking. This analysis
also overlooks, as did the Supreme Court's opinion in Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), claims that the withdrawal of a previously
enjoyed benefit is a burden against which the law can protect without payment
of just compensation. How should the law of takings apply if a person buys
property at a price based on a proposed plan of redevelopment, which at the
time would have been legal, but, as a result of subsequent legislation, is prohibited or severely curtailed? It is one thing if, because of a change in policy, such
curtailment is reasonably thought to be necessary to protect, or protect better,
the physical health or safety of others. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 8283 (1946). It is quite another to curtail redevelopment because others now find
certain values in the historic or natural features of the land which they would
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III. CHOOSING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TO CREATE
RULES OF GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION
A.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The diverse and uncertain attitudes of many state courts
toward the concept of separation of powers is well-illustrated
by Professor Mandelker's discussion of exclusionary zoning
and his discussion of judicial implementation of environmental
preservation legislation. Some courts have been willing to engage in substantial lawmaking when dealing with problems of
exclusionary zoning. 18 In contrast, most courts have declined
to assume a similar role when asked to implement statutory or
constitutional provisions designed to preserve environmental
resources.
Professor Mandelker's several references to separation of
powers are almost always oblique. 1 9 He does not clearly articulate the significance of the concept and the values it represents
in his discussion of the role that courts may properly assume in
developing legal rules and policies. Sometimes he indicates
that the legislature should perform these tasks.20 At other
times he appears to contend that courts should play the dominant role,2 ' arguing 22 that courts should assume a prominent
23
lawmaking role if there is or may be any "law to apply."
Suitable deference to the doctrine of separation of powers
on the part of courts is, however, essential to the preservation
like to see preserved for their beneficial enjoyment. I would suggest that Professor Sax's original analysis, which would require compensation in these circumstances, provides the soundest reasoning. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 67-76 (1964); see also G. BJORK, supra note 7, at 112, 122
(argument for compensation).
18. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
19. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 2, 55, 72, 126.
20. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 5; see also id. at 133-49.
21. Id. at 2; see also id. at 55-74, 107-26.
22. "[J]udicial policymaking, in environmental and exclusionary zoning
cases finds support in the moral force of statutory and constitutional mandates." Id. at 55. "The broad and open-ended command of the equal-protection
clause arguably provides a moral force to judicial decisions that invalidate exclusionary zoning. Environmental legislation implements environmental values that likewise support judicial policymaking in environmental cases." Id. at
72-73.
23. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 413
(1971). The fact that a court may engage in judicial review because there is law
to be applied does not mean a court may disregard statutory (nor implicit constitutional) limitations on the scope of such review. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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of a democratic, representative form of government. Too much
reliance on courts for the development of legal policy is likely
to sap both the electorate and their representatives of their basic confidence in the political system. Professor Mandelker's
book would have been significantly enhanced had he been willing to offer an analysis that might help to identify those lawmaking decisions so clearly legislative or executive that a court
24
may not make them without acting unconstitutionally.
Professor Mandelker does adopt 2 5 Professor Lon Fuller's
concept of polycentric decision making26 and suggests that it
may be useful when trying to distinguish legislative from judicial decisions. He does not, however, explain the basis for this
suggestion. Nonetheless, he frequently implies that the more
polycentric a problem is, the more likely a court will view it as
being within the province of the legislature or the executive,
rather than the judiciary. 27 In such a case, he suggests, a court
will either refuse to resolve the problem, or seek to avoid addressing it directly by using various procedural devices 28 that
can result in a decision being made by default.
The polycentric nature of lawmaking does provide some
clues as to why, if government is going to intervene, it is generally preferable to have the legislature rather than the judiciary
create the legal rules. Legislatures are simply better equipped
to make such decisions. Whenever a court makes legal rules,
there is the problem of the opportunity to be heard and to participate in the lawmaking process. This problem arises because
the primary function of courts is not to create rules of law, but
rather to receive evidence and, based on that evidence, to determine specific historic facts as they relate to the parties
24. For example, compare Eastside Baptist Church v. Klein, 175 Colo. 168,
478 P.2d 549 (1971) (court used independent judgment in reviewing determination of board of zoning adjustment that "accessory use" includes storage of
church buses in parking lot) with Monte Vista Professional Bldg. v. City of
Monte Vista, 35 Colo. App. 235, 531 P.2d 400 (1975) (court used only an "abuse
of discretion" standard in reviewing definition of hardship established by same
board under authority to grant variances).
25. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 64-65.
26. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L REv. 353,
394-404 (1978).
A polycentric problem, for Professor Fuller, is one in which there are many
factors-burdens and benefits-which must be weighed and balanced in the decision making process. Because the factors are interrelated, the ultimate decision involves the establishment of a hierarchy of values. The ideal balance will
inevitably be somewhat uncertain and intuitive, and will depend upon the individual value system of the decision maker. Id.
27. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 55, 63-67, 85, 108, 111, 117, 155-56.
28. Id. at 68-71, 109.

1290

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1282

before the court.2 9 In turn, these findings will determine
whether the sanction provided by a relevant rule of law is to be
applied. Because the truth or falsity of the claimed historic
facts will determine the allocation of burdens and benefits
among the litigants, the law of parties-standing, real party in
interest, and intervention-generally limits participation in the
lawsuit to those persons in whose favor and against whom the
sanction provided by the rule of law may be imposed. Even
though other people, such as family members of a losing plaintiff or defendant, are also likely to incur an extended benefit or
burden, courts usually assume that the litigants' protection of
their interests will be sufficient to protect any legitimate interests of such other people.
Traditionally, of course, courts have frequently decided
questions of law as part of the adjudicative process. Under our
system of stare decisis, judge-made law is likely to affect the
behavior of people who are not parties to the suit; their behavior will in turn create a further extended series of burdens and
benefits for additional nonparties. Any person admitted to a
lawsuit as a litigant, therefore, necessarily stands as a representative of others-all those who may feel some benefit or
burden, depending not only on how the historic facts may be
determined, but, more importantly, on the content of any new
rule of law the court may create.
The law of standing generally assumes that any person
with a sufficiently strong interest in the disputed historic facts
will also advocate the creation of the best rule of law, should
any question of law arise.30 Unfortunately, judicial law creation, like the marketplace, tends to be overly self-centered,31
29. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 222, 257 N.E.2d 870,
871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970).
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of
parties before it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes
greatly affect public issues. Large questions of law are often resolved
by the manner in which private litigation is decided. But this is normally incident to the court's main function to settle controversy. It is a
rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in private litigation as
a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court.
Id.
30. Professor Mandelker's discussion of standing, D. MMMELKER, supra
note 1, at 59-63, is largely descriptive, though he hints at the relationship between standing and separation of powers. See id. at 62.
31. Under the view of standing most recently announced by the United
States Supreme Court, a litigant's interest must be strongly self-centered. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and
State, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). The Court also details how strongly the doctrines of
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because not all those who may incur an externality from a decision will have had a meaningful opportunity to participate. The
parties to a lawsuit have an interest in influencing the creation
of any new law to accord with their value systems, which may
not be congruous with the values of other people who will be
affected. 32 Although judges creating a rule of law can consider
the interests of others, they are likely to consider only those
burdens, benefits, and values that the parties call to the court's
attention and include in their arguments.
In addition, courts often lack the fact finding capacities essential to the creation of sound rules of law. The rules of judicial fact finding are designed for determining the truth or
falsity of historic facts as they relate to the particular parties.
When the facts to be determined are what Professor Kenneth
Davis has characterized as "legislative facts," 33 the formal fact
finding rules of the courts are rarely, if ever, appropriate. Indeed, the courts themselves seldom use them. The formal rules
of evidence are more likely to hinder than to enhance the accuracy of factual determinations about the consequences of a proposed rule of law.
Fair, intelligent law creation requires conscientious
lawmakers to seek a clear, complete understanding of all the
extended burdens and benefits that may flow from their decisions. How those burdens and benefits will be perceived and
be assessed will depend on the decision makers' value systems,
their perceptions of how the real world functions, and the extent to which those who may be affected have been able and
willing to participate in the decision making process. In these
terms, when compared to the legislative process, judicial lawmaking is generally more closed, less democratic, more costly,
34
and less thorough.
These basic differences between judicial and legislative
standing are grounded, by way of the "cases or controversies" requirement, in
the concept of separation of powers.
32. In cases involving environmental litigation and exclusionary zoning,
Professor Mandelker acknowledges the extraordinarily broad range of interests
a court must consider. D. MANDELKxER, supra note 1, at 65.
33. "Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties [unlike
adjudicative, i.e., historic facts] but are general facts which help the tribunal
decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE
LAw TREATISE § 12.3 (2d ed. 1978). Professor Mandelker refers to these as "social facts." D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 67-68.
34. "Courts do not have the capability for gathering information that legislatures possess.... Even third parties may not present all the relevant information. They represent a point of view and are likely to offer expert evidence
that supports their advocacy position." D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 68.
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lawmaking are at the heart of the separation of powers problem, and help to explain some of Professor Mandelker's principle observations, for example, why in environmental litigation
the courts have been reluctant to take a more prominent role
developing more precise, concrete rules of decision.35 These
differences also explain why many courts feel uncomfortable
trying to decide environmental preservation cases on an individual basis, using a cost-benefit analysis. 3 6 The values at stake
in these cases are too uncertain, the consequences too diffuse,
and the procedural rules for developing essential information
too inadequate for any court not to recognize, implicitly or explicitly, the risks of acting unconstitutionally.
B.

DECENTRALIZED DECISION MAKING

In the final section of Professor Mandelker's book, he describes 37 the development and implementation of the Federal
Coastal Zoning Management Act of 1972.38 He laments Congress's choice of a decentralized model for developing the more
specific legal policies and rules required for implementing the
Act. 39 Because the legislative process is the preferred mode of
lawmaking in a democratic representative form of government,
Professor Mandelker's criticism raises two additional separation of powers questions-what justifies the delegation of so
much lawmaking authority downward from the national to the
local level, and why is so much reliance placed on the development of subordinate legal rules through adjudicative
processes?
Questions involving the allocation of lawmaking powers
among the national, state, and local governments involve an assessment of the extended burdens and benefits that may or
may not result from whatever developments are permitted
along our nation's seacoasts. Coastal management necessarily
affects interests that can fairly be characterized as local, regional, and national. Moreover, people are likely to regard the
benefits and burdens of regulation differently, depending on
35. Id. at 126, 155-56.
36. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974);
SST, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 288 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Minn. 1979).
37. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 133-52.
38. See supra note 5.
39. D. MANDEER, supra note 1, at 147-48, 156. This decentralized lawmaking process resulted from Congress's delegation of substantial lawmaking authority to state and local governments, limiting that authority by only a few,
very broadly worded policy guidelines.
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whether they live in the immediate coastal area, another part of
a coastal state, or an inland state. To the extent that legal decision making processes should seek to accommodate this broad
spectrum of interests, some congressional delegation of lawmaking authority is obviously warranted.
Decentralized decision making also requires a choice between the two basic methods of law creation-legislative or adjudicative, whether the adjudication is to be judicial or
administrative. 40 This choice involves an evaluation of whether
the advantages of creating law on a case-by-case, after-the-fact
basis justify the dilution of democratic representative governmental values which is likely to occur. Reliance on an adjudicative process for creating specific rules reduces the
opportunities for participation in the decision making process
by those who will incur extended burdens and benefits. Such
reliance also increases the risk of arbitrary decisions in particular cases. In addition, the retroactive nature of adjudicative
lawmaking may result in economic waste, because, had the relevant law been known in advance, resources, both public and
private, might have been committed differently. On the other
hand, adjudicative lawmaking may permit greater flexibility, on
an ongoing basis, in the shaping and reshaping of the legal
rules. Such reshaping, occurring in the context of more concrete facts, may also be done with a clearer understanding of
the impacts any particular rule may have.
Whatever may be the legitimate reasons for a legislature's
choice of a decentralized system for the development of
subordinate legal rules, Professor Mandelker is doubtlessly correct in his conclusion 4 ' that this choice should not be made
simply to avoid the political controversy that the legislative creation of such rules might otherwise generate. Delegation of
broad lawmaking authority to others for this reason clearly cuts
against the basic values of democratic representative
government.
40. There are also many policy considerations involved in deciding
whether to choose courts or administrative agencies as the primary adjudicators. For an early and now classic discussion of some of these considerations,
see LANDIS, THE ADImiSTRATIm PROCESS 6-46, 89-98 (1938). Two common differences between courts and administrative adjudicators are: (1) an administrative adjudicator usually has an independent staff to assist in developing
"legislative facts," and (2) the opportunities and procedures for interested persons to participate are usually greater and less formal in administrative proceedings. For a discussion strongly favoring legislative-like lawmaking, see 1 I.
DAVIS, ADMmISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.13-6.15 (2d ed. 1978).
41. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 133, 136, 155, 157.
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CONCLUSION

Professor Mandelker's book is essentially about how we
ought to determine which of our institutions should make the
decisions that will distribute the burdens and benefits created
by our living together as a society. The book thus deals with
some of the most fundamental ideas about society, government,
and the legal system. Because Professor Mandelker addresses
such fundamental concepts, one would have expected a more
thoughtful articulation and analysis of these ideas, particularly
as they relate to, or are illustrated by, the five major problems
he discusses. His descriptions of the problems themselves and
how they have been dealt with are informative. His explanations of their treatment, however, only hint at the significance
of the underlying principles and processes of government involved. Professor Mandelker's book would have served its purposes better had he given those principles and processes more
consideration. Nonetheless, his book does convey to the reader
some sense of the complexity of the issues and problems he
does discuss, and the difficulty of identifying principled bases
for resolving them.
Howard C. Klemme**
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